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ABSTRACT
Cosmologists will soon be in a unique position. Observational noise will gradually be
replaced by cosmic variance as the dominant source of uncertainty in an increasing
number of observations. We reflect on the ramifications for the discovery and veri-
fication of new models. If there are features in the full data set that call for a new
model, there will be no subsequent observations to test that model’s predictions. We
give specific examples of the problem by discussing the pitfalls of model discovery by
prior adjustment in the context of dark energy models and inflationary theories. We
show how the gradual release of data can mitigate this difficulty, allowing anomalies to
be identified, and new models to be proposed and tested. We advocate that observers
plan for the frugal release of data from future cosmic variance limited observations.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cosmologists can only make observations on (or occasionally
within) our past light cone. Whatever the reality of the mul-
tiverse, we Earth-bound humans of the TCMB=2.725K era
have access to only a finite volume of space, containing finite
energy and information. The exciting period in which we find
ourselves learning more and more about this volume of ac-
cessible space and its contents cannot last forever. While we
are unlikely to gather all the existing information content of
the observable universe, we are already making substantial
inroads on the information of cosmic significance.
The most notable example of confronting the finite in-
formation content of the universe is our measurements of the
power in the lowest multipoles Cℓ of the cosmic microwave
background (CMB) temperature anisotropies. Their statis-
tical error bars are now smaller than the “cosmic variance”
errors – the expected difference between what we measure
for these multipoles and what we would measure if we could
average over many independent horizon volumes. The range
of ℓ for which this is true is increasing as the Wilkinson
Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) continues to report
new results. This trend will accelerate as new experiments
join the fray. (Though we could wait a few hundred million
years to gain access to a mostly-independent last scattering
surface.)
The CMB temperature-temperature power spectrum is
unlikely to be the last place where the finite universe limits
cosmology. Astronomical surveys are already cataloguing an
increasing fraction of all the structures within our past light
cone. Redshifted hydrogen hyperfine instruments will even-
tually extend the volume over which we map the structure
of matter nearly out to the horizon.
There are consequences to becoming a data limited sci-
ence. We upset the balance between applying the brain’s
remarkable pattern-finding abilities and testing the robust-
ness of the patterns we discover. We may see patterns in
finite data, but, unable to collect new data, we have no way
to confirm their reality, missing out on potentially signifi-
cant discoveries. We risk falling for what particle physicists
call “the look elsewhere effect”, i.e. the spurious “discov-
ery” of statistically significant anomalies which are merely
the consequence of performing a large number of tests on
the same data. A small fraction of those are bound to re-
port significant “evidence” for unexpected features due to
random noise. Unlike experimental scientists, we may no
longer be able to collect data, form a new hypothesis, and
test its predictions. Our ability to distinguish between sta-
tistical fluctuations and real effects becomes limited.
Given that the challenge of finite data is upon us, our
best hope is to devise strategies to minimize its effects. The
approach that we shall explore and advocate is to simulate
the cycle of data acquisition and analysis by being frugal. By
allowing colleagues to see only subsets of the data, construct
hypotheses based on them, then test those hypotheses on
larger subsets, we can aim to avoid unexplained anomalies
with untestable explanations.
The benefits of frugality arise not from some magical
improvements in the statistical power of the data, but from
acknowledging and mitigating a basic human failing: over-
confidence. Specifically, by assigning all probability to the
set of physical models that we have thought about and con-
sequently zero probability to all other models, we ignore
that we may not have considered the correct model. Fru-
gality allows us to redress those wrongs by admitting such
models and testing their predictions on our remaining data.
We examine the effects of (and several strategies for) divid-
ing cosmological data into several pieces so that new models
can be consistently explored.
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2 MODEL DISCOVERY
2.1 Bayesian model selection and prior updating
We take a Bayesian outlook on hypothesis testing, as we
believe (and show below) that this closely reflects the way
we think about models. Another reason for being wary of
the usual (frequentist) practice of reporting p-values is that
the latter are not probabilities for hypotheses, despite be-
ing commonly misinterpreted as such (Sellke et al. 2001;
Gordon & Trotta 2007). Suppose we have a model M0 with
parameters θ0, that we wish to evaluate in light of data
d. Our updated state of belief in the model’s parameters
is given by the posterior probability distribution function
(pdf) on θ0, obtained via Bayes’ theorem:
p(θ0|d,M0) = p(d|θ0,M0)p(θ0|M0)
p(d|M0) , (1)
where p(d|θ0,M0) is the likelihood, p(θ0|M0) the prior on
the parameters θ0, and p(d|M0) is the marginal likelihood
for M0. Now suppose we notice a feature in the data that
is not reproduced by model M0 (for example by computing
the doubt, as in Starkman et al. (2008)). We invent a model
M1 with parameters θ1 as an explanation for said feature
and compute the evidence for both models (i = 0, 1)
p(d|Mi) =
Z
dθip(d|θi,Mi)p(θi|Mi) . (2)
Each model’s posterior probability in light of d is given
by p(Mi|d) = p(d|Mi)p(Mi)/p(d). The ratio of our de-
grees of belief in the models, the Bayes factor B10 =
p(d|M1)/p(d|M0), penalizes models that are unnecessarily
complex, for example because of an excessive number of free
parameters, automatically encapsulating Occam’s razor (see
e.g. Trotta (2007a, 2008)). In order to increase confidence
in the new model M1, all that is required is B10 > 1, i.e.
that M1 be a more “effective” description of the presently
available data. There is no dependence on the model’s pre-
dictivity for future observations.
In practice, a new model probably would not (and ar-
guably should not) be accepted until it produces a cor-
rect prediction for future data d′ that differs from the old
model’s, thus enabling the models to be distinguished. For-
mally, the models’ relative posterior odds after seeing both
sets of data are given by
p(M1|d, d′)
p(M0|d, d′) =
p(d′|M1)
p(d′|M0)
p(d|M1)
p(d|M0)
p(M1)
p(M0)
. (3)
Before the data set d came along, model M1 was not even
on the table: p(M1) = 0. The step of introducing M1 while
absolutely crucial, formally requires the injection of an infi-
nite amount of information to raise p(M1) from 0 to a finite
value. This prior adjustment is on top of the change in de-
gree of belief coming from d. It amounts to using the data d
twice, first to introduce M1 by adjusting its prior and then
to evaluate the evidence from d.
The duplicate use of the data d leads to posterior odds
which can seriously overstate the statistical significance of
a new effect. We suggest to “forget” about the details of d,
compress its information into a new non-zero (and still sub-
jective) prior p(M1), and then compute the posterior odds
arising solely from d′, i.e.
p(M1|d, d′)
p(M0|d, d′) =
p(d′|M1)
p(d′|M0)
p(M1)
p(M0)
. (4)
If an unlimited amount of data is accessible and the anomaly
is correctly modelled byM1, it is guaranteed to become even-
tually favored by the Bayes factor, independent of the exact
choices of priors. Using a finite, cosmic-variance-limited data
set only increases the likelihood that M1 is confirmed before
the data is exhausted, the more the bigger the fraction of
unused data in d′.
2.2 Examples of prior adjustments in cosmology
Two notable examples in cosmology of devising new mod-
els and then adjusting their priors are the discovery of dark
energy and the realization that inflation can easily accom-
modate Ω < 1.
The discovery of a non-zero, yet tiny cosmological con-
stant Λ was in stark contradiction to prior expectations.
Particle-physics considerations suggested that Λ should ei-
ther be 0 (modelM1) or have a uniform prior between ±M4p
(model M2), p(Λ|M1) = δ(Λ), p(Λ|M2) = Θ(|Λ| − M4p )/
2M4p , where Mp is the reduced Planck mass, Θ(x) is a step
function and δ(x) is a Dirac delta distribution. Oversimpli-
fying history, let us assume these were the only theories at
hand, and had equal priors1: p(M1) = p(M2) = 12 .
Along came supernova (SN) redshift measurements
(Perlmutter et al. 1999), suggesting a late time acceleration
of the universe driven by (in the simplest models) a small
Λ0
M4
p
≈ 10−120. To simplify, let us assume that the available
SN data presented a 5σ deviation from Λ = 0. Comput-
ing the Bayes factor using the Savage-Dickey density ratio
(Trotta 2007b) gives
B12 =
p(Λ = 0|d,M2)
p(Λ = 0|M2) =
10121√
2π
e−25/2 ≈ 10115 . (5)
Due to the strong Occam’s razor effect of the prior onM2,
a vanishing cosmological constant should hafve still been
vastly preferred, with odds of order 10115 : 1, over a model
including a hugely fine-tuned Λ. A ∼ 23σ detection of a
non-zero cosmological constant would have been required to
override the Occam’s razor of the prior.
However, the particle physics community started re-
considering priors and developed a new model M3 involv-
ing anthropic reasoning which gave more weight to small
values of Λ, p(Λ|M3) = Θ(10Λ0 − Λ)/10Λ0, with model
priors now p(M1) = p(M2) = p(M3) = 13 . Under the
new anthropic prior, the effect of Occam’s razor is vastly
reduced, giving a Bayes factor B13 ≈ 10−4, now favoring
model M3. The parameter value that was a priori consid-
ered unnatural under the original model for a cosmologi-
cal constant (small non-zero Λ) described the data better
than the prevailing model of Λ = 0, but not sufficiently well
to be preferred. Introducing an anthropic model based on
the landscape picture in string theory (Bousso & Polchinski
2000; Giddings et al. 2002; Douglas 2003; Susskind 2003;
1 An interesting suggestion for choosing model’s priors based
on a Maximum Entropy argument has been put forward
by Brewer & Francis (2009).
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Starkman & Trotta 2006) allowed a small, non-zero cosmo-
logical constant to become the preferred description of the
data which has since been supported by other observations
such as CMB and baryon acoustic oscillations.
It is interesting that ex post facto one might argue that
perhaps Λ is restricted to be a positive quantity, in which
case the appropriate prior would be uniform in lnΛ rather
than in Λ (Evrard & Coles 1995; Kirchner & Ellis 2003).
Under this model M4, and assuming a cut-off Λ > Λmin =
10−500M4p (see Starkman & Trotta (2006)), one obtains a
Bayes factor B14 ≈ 10−2, i.e. moderate support for Λ, anal-
ogously to what can be obtained by anthropic arguments.
An earlier example of discovering a new model through
adjusting priors happened in the mid to late 90s. The over-
whelming evidence for Ωtot ≈ 0.3 < 1 posed a problem
for inflation, as it had been viewed to generically predict
a flat universe with Ω ≈ 1 to high accuracy – this gener-
ally accepted model could not describe observations. Dif-
ferent models (mostly using multiple stages of inflation)
were devised that produced open universes (Bucher et al.
1995). In other words, after observing that Ω ≈ 0.3, the
priors for single stage inflation, p(M0), and for multi stage
inflation, p(M1), were adjusted from p(M0) ≫ p(M1) to
p(M1) ≈ p(M0). The prediction for future observations –
corroborating evidence for Ω ≈ 0.3 – was proven wrong by
measurements of Ω ≈ 1 (Netterfield et al. 2002). The priors
were reverted back to p(M0) ≫ p(M1), making multi-stage
models all but obsolete.
Note that in both the above examples, it was crucial
that predictions of the new model could be tested by follow-
up independent observations which either confirmed or re-
jected the new model.
3 THE NEED FOR FRUGALITY
With the launch of the Planck satellite, the power spectrum
of the temperature fluctuations, CTTℓ , will be limited by cos-
mic variance all the way up to ℓ > 2000. No future observa-
tion will ever obtain more precise measurements of the CMB
temperature fluctuations in this ℓ range (barring problems
with unanticipated systematics), and higher ℓ−ranges begin
to be dominated by foreground sources. If there are features
in the Planck data that can not be adequately explained by
ΛCDM (such as a strong correlation between different mul-
tipoles), we could and should devise a revised concordance
model. But we would be unable to test its predictions with
future CMB temperature measurements!
After the COBE experiment (Smoot et al. 1992)
observed hints of a low quadrupole, it took subse-
quent confirming measurements by WMAP to estab-
lish this, (Spergel et al. 2003, 2007; Komatsu et al. 2009)
and to detect the planarity of the quadrupole and oc-
topole and their alignment with each other, perpendic-
ular to the ecliptic, with an axis toward the CMB
dipole (de Oliveira-Costa et al. 2004; Schwarz et al. 2004;
Land & Magueijo 2005), where cosmic variance already is
the limiting factor. Thus possible new models explaining the
low ℓ multipole alignments cannot be tested on their predic-
tions for future measurements of these multipoles. Instead,
one has to look for different predictions from the new mod-
els, e.g. by looking for circles in the sky as a signature of
a topologically non-trivial universe (Cornish et al. 2004). If
only parts of the WMAP data had been released, tantalizing
enough to induce people to look for new models, there would
have been room to test the predictions of these models for
the low ℓs.
In the (perhaps not so distant) future, a similar situ-
ation will arise with other cosmological experiments. Large
scale structure observations by way of galaxy counts will
eventually measure the positions and redshifts of all galax-
ies in the our Hubble patch with high precision (neglecting
uncertainties due to non-linearities). The distribution of hy-
drogen will be mapped with observations or the Ly-α forest.
Eventually all observations on cosmological scales will reach
the cosmic variance limit, as we only have this one universe
from which to sample.
In light of this, it seems imperative to reflect on ways
to extract an optimal amount of information from complete
finite data sets. They should be not only be used to better
constrain parameters of the concordance model, but to dis-
cover and test new models. We need to devise schemes for
incremental data release as cosmological analogues of blind
analysis, a procedure often used in particle physics, where
the need to avoid the (possibly unconscious) influence of the
statistical methodology adopted on the significance of the re-
sults is a well recognized problem, see e.g. Lyons (2008). For
example, one wants to avoid (unwillingly) biassing the signif-
icance of a signal when designing the “cuts” on the number
of observed events. Several strategies have been devised to
this end. For example, a random number can be added to
the data, and subtracted only after all corrections and other
data manipulations have been performed; or just a fraction
of the data is employed to define the statistical procedure,
while the remainder of the data are only revealed in a subse-
quent phase. After that point no further adjustments of the
methodology are allowed. The split of data in subsets can
either happen in time (an obvious solution for many particle
physics experiments) or in data space. In the latter case, a
“signal box” of data is left closed until potential anomalies in
the first chunk of observations have been identified and sta-
tistical tests for their confirmation designed, at which point
the box is opened and the analysis unblinded. An example
of such a procedure is the miniBooNE neutrino oscillation
experiment (Bazarko 2001). Another method is sometimes
adopted by precision measurements where the analysis team
is allowed to see the full data sets, but with arbitrary units.
The resulting parameter constraints are rescaled to the ac-
tual units only at the very end of the analysis.
All of those strategies are designed with the common
aim of keeping a part of the information hidden from the
first stage of the analysis, so as to be able to exploit the full
statistical power of the hidden data upon unblinding. We
now turn to the discussion of possible ways of applying this
idea in the cosmological context.
4 STRATEGIES FOR THE RELEASE OF
PARTIAL DATA
There is always a random element involved in choosing a
good way to split data, where the definition of “good” of-
ten depends on the unknown anomalies one is hoping to be
able to test. Suppose we throw a single coin 2N times after
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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which it is lost. The first N throws include an equal number
of heads and tails, while the last N tosses are all tails. Split-
ting this data set in these two chunks, the first set points
towards the model of a fair coin. The second set (all tails)
raises serious doubt about this model. But we have no way
of verifying the predictions of a new model (e.g. the coin was
exchanged for an all-tails coin) as the coin was lost. Had we
split the data into four equal chunks, then after examining
the third chunk we would likely have proposed a new model
of an unfair all-tails coin. The predictions of this new model
would have been tested (and confirmed) by the fourth chunk
of data.
Two opposing forces are at play when considering ways
to release partial data. On the one hand, releasing individ-
ual data points will lead to many statistical flukes that can
be mistaken for features in the data. On the other hand, re-
leasing all data at once will only allow to determine the pa-
rameters of the existing models and not to check predictions
of potential new models. It seems hard to find an optimal
number of chunks, even more so as it is not even clear how
data should be split.
The most natural way to release partial data is often by
time ordering, such as is employed by many experiments,
for example WMAP. A natural cut-off between data sets
is the point in time when (if) the doubt (Starkman et al.
2008) on a concordance or reference model reaches a crit-
ical threshold, after which an alternative model should be
devised. Using only data that was not used to compute the
doubt on the original model, compute the doubt on the new
model. Iterate this process until all data has been taken or
funding runs out. This method does not detect all features
as the likelihood function typically does not incorporate all
predictions of the original model. For example, the riddles of
why the two point correlation function of the temperature
fluctuations vanishes at separation angles larger than 60◦
(Copi et al. 2006) and of the alignments of the quadrupole
and octopole (de Oliveira-Costa et al. 2004; Schwarz et al.
2004; Land & Magueijo 2005) would escape detection as the
likelihood function is insensitive to these features.
Summary statistics for CMB measurements often are
presented in the form of (binned) Cℓ’s building on isotropy
and Gaussianity of the alm’s. Other quantities, such as C(θ),
would work as well. A possible course of action would be to
exclusively release binned Cℓ’s in the first data release. Then
a search for deviations from the concordance model – new
features – could be conducted. If any unexpected features
are noted in the data, new models would be devised and
their predictions for the unbinned Cℓ’s could be compared
against the second, unbinned data release. One might en-
vision performing a finer graining of the binning process,
going from e.g. ∆ℓ = 10 bins in the first year to ∆ℓ = 5 bins
in the second year to ∆ℓ = 1 bins in the third year, or in
terms of the two-point function C(θ) using averaged values
over ∆θ = 10◦, 1◦, 0.1◦, . . . for each release cycle. A possi-
ble complication is the fact that the successive data releases
include the previous data and hence are correlated.
However, there is a way to split data guaranteeing
uncorrelated data chunks: principal component analysis
(PCA)(Huterer & Starkman 2003). Each principal compo-
nent, i.e. eigenvector and eigenvalue of the data’s covari-
ance matrix, is released separately, giving as many attempts
at finding new models as there are well-constrained PCAs.
Their order seems to be a matter of taste. Releasing the best-
constrained component first would make it easiest to detect
any features, then using the less-well constrained modes to
verify any new model. Not producing any hints at a new
model, this procedure – as any splitting of data – would
not have any negative impact on parameter estimation (as
Bayesian updating of posterior pdfs does not care about the
order of the information being added).
Independent of how the data is split, sizing the indi-
vidual chunks also seems to be rather an art. They should
neither be too small, i.e. not so noisy as to induce spurious
features, nor too large, or new models will not be testable.
It may prove beneficial to release data chunks with the same
information content, as measured e.g. by the mean square
error or an information-theory based measure such as the
Kullback–Leibler divergence.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Cosmologists are in a paradoxical situation. They strive to
acquire data of the highest possible quality to constrain pa-
rameters of their models as quickly as possible. But they
should be open to new features in the data that are not
predicted by current models, and hence to the possibility
of having to devise new models and test their predictions.
We have argued that for the latter step, availability of fresh
data is crucial, which for cosmic variance limited data sets
is simply not possible. We therefore propose that such ulti-
mate data sets be treated as the precious resources they are
and released slowly and carefully.
We have discussed various strategies for parsing such
data sets. It remains an art to find the optimal way to split
data and release it, involving inevitably a certain degree of
luck to detect unexpected features. It seems to us from this
first overview that the most promising way of “dividing the
plunder” is to employ a PCA decomposition of the data
and release data parts of equal information content. This is
a compromise between being able to find new features and
having enough data left to reliably test possible new models.
However, the best strategy is likely to depend heavily on
the particular data set, and on the taste of the individual
investigators. Wishing to avoid that basic human failing of
over-confidence we acknowledge that there is a reasonable
chance that we have overlooked the optimal strategy.
We urge our observational colleagues to be frugal with
their data. Slicing the data and doling it out slowly is in all
of our long term best interests.
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